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INTRODUCTION
The Modern Corporation and Private Property begins with a
startling characterization of the business world of the 1930s: “Grown to
tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a ‘corporate
system’—as there was once a feudal system.”1 Berle and Means argued
that the emergence of this system had fundamentally transformed the role
of the corporation in society, and that corporations had become so large
and influential that their behavior impacted “the life of the country and . . .
every individual.”2 Yet their enormous scale meant that they were financed
by “the wealth of innumerable individuals,” nearly all of whom had
become completely passive investors with no role in their governance:
ownership was separated from control.3 To Berle and Means this meant
that traditional concepts of the corporation were no longer adequate. A
new concept of the corporation was needed—a concept that might imply
that the interests of the community ought to be incorporated into corporate
conduct.
The arguments framing The Modern Corporation are quite
historically specific. The book claims that the rapid growth of large
businesses over the decades preceding its publication had produced
something “beyond the imagination of most statesmen and businessmen at
the opening of the present century.”4 It also draws contrasts between the
corporate system of the 1930s and corporations from earlier eras. The
reader is told, for example, that ownership and control were unified within
nineteenth century corporations, and that large quasi-public firms with
* Eric Hilt is Professor of Economics, Wellesley College, and Research Associate, National Bureau
of Economic Research. Email: ehilt@wellesley.edu.
1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 3–4 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., rev. ed. 1967) (1932).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 4–5.
4. Id. at 3.
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thousands of shareholders gradually began to displace smaller enterprises
and dominate many sectors of the economy over time.
Yet in spite of the importance of history in The Modern Corporation,
the book presents only a cursory sketch of the historical processes that led
to the emergence of the corporate system and no clear account of the
timing of developments such as the separation of ownership from control
among major corporations.5 In part, this reflects the difficulty of
researching the early history of the American corporation and the paucity
of surviving business records from the nineteenth century. But it also may
reflect the intuitive notion that the major corporations of the 1930s were
so much larger and so different from early business enterprises that it was
hardly necessary to document the differences in detail. That the rise of the
corporate system and the separation of ownership from control were recent
developments likely seemed obvious. Much of the subsequent literature
on the evolution of the corporate form accepted the historical claims of
Berle and Means.6
Yet the evolution of the American business corporation was more
complex and varied than this intuitive characterization would imply. Many
corporations chartered in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
were in fact quite large, and the lists of their initial subscribers sometimes
included more than a thousand names.7 By the early nineteenth century,
securities exchanges had opened in several American cities, facilitating
trade in the stock of many of those enterprises and helping to diffuse the
shares among larger numbers of investors.8 And there is evidence that
problems related to what Berle and Means called the “divergence of
interest between ownership and control” were present as well.9 For
example, the history of American railroads includes scandalous episodes
of insiders enriching themselves at the expense of the other securities

5. See, e.g., id. at 4.
6. See, e.g., Edwin M. Dodd, A Series of Six Lectures at the Institute of the Cleveland Bar
Association (Dec. 8–10, 1937), in LECTURES ON THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE IN THE
UNITED STATES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION passim (1938);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937 passim (1991); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 passim (2001).
7. See, e.g., John Majewski, Toward a Social History of the Corporation: Shareholding in
Pennsylvania, 1800–1840, in THE ECONOMY OF EARLY AMERICA 294, 302 (Cathy Matson ed., 2006)
(“[T]he Pennsylvania Archives data reveal that ten of the banks chartered in 1814 had more than one
thousand investors.”).
8. See, e.g., Peter Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging Financial Markets and Early US
Growth, 42 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 1, 6–8 (2005) (documenting the number of securities traded
on the exchanges in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston 1790–1850).
9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 112.
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holders.10 And the shareholders of mid-nineteenth century manufacturing
corporations complained that the directors of those enterprises engaged in
self-dealing and manipulated proxy voting to entrench themselves in their
positions.11 The corporations of the 1930s were different from those of
earlier eras, but it is not clear whether those differences were consistent
with the claims of Berle and Means.
This Article presents new evidence on the evolution of the business
corporation in America and on the emergence of what is commonly termed
the “Berle and Means corporation.” Drawing on a wide range of sources,
I investigate three major historical claims of The Modern Corporation:
that large corporations had displaced small ones by the early twentieth
century; that the quasi-public corporations of the 1930s were much larger
than the public corporations of the nineteenth century; and that ownership
was separated from control to a much greater extent in the 1930s compared
to the nineteenth century. I address each of these claims with new data and
present analyses of nineteenth century corporations that mirror Berle and
Means’s analysis of the corporations of the 1930s. The conclusions I draw
from these analyses revise the historical claims of The Modern
Corporation in important ways.
To determine whether large corporations displaced small enterprises,
I document changes in the total number of business corporations in the
United States over time. If large corporations had indeed taken the place
of small ones by the 1930s, then the total number of business corporations
should have fallen. Next, I investigate whether the large enterprises
chronicled in The Modern Corporation were in fact larger than the public
companies of the nineteenth century by documenting the scale of public
companies sampled from different points in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Finally, I analyze the ownership structure of public
companies from the 1820s, 1870s, and 1930s to investigate whether there
were changes in the degree to which ownership was separated from control
over time.
The first conclusion I reach is that large corporations did not displace
small corporations, as Berle and Means claimed. The early twentieth
century in fact witnessed a flourishing of the small business corporation,
as reflected in rapid growth in the total number of corporations. The huge
manufacturing firms and utilities that are the focus of The Modern
Corporation apparently coexisted with large and growing numbers of very
small corporations, rather than displacing them.
10. See, e.g., Charles F. Adams, Jr., A Chapter of Erie, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER
ESSAYS 4, 4–99 (1871).
11. See, e.g., J.C. AYER, SOME OF THE USAGES AND ABUSES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS 3–24 (1863).
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On the other hand, consistent with the argument of the book, I find
that the quasi-public corporations of the 1930s were indeed significantly
larger than their predecessors from either the nineteenth century or the
earlier decades of the twentieth century, both in absolute terms and relative
to average incomes. Berle and Means were correct in their judgment that
the largest businesses of their time had achieved a scale that was
historically unprecedented.
But even though they were larger than their predecessors from earlier
eras, it does not necessarily follow that ownership was separated from
control within those enterprises to a greater extent. Berle and Means
clearly argue that the “surrender of control” among investors that resulted
from the diffusion of shareholding was a “new aspect” of the corporation
in their time.12 Yet direct comparisons between the ownership structures
of the 200 corporations chronicled in their book with those of public
companies from earlier eras reveal that the separation of ownership from
control was not a modern phenomenon. In fact, ownership was separated
from control to a lesser extent among the 1930s corporations studied by
Berle and Means than among the public companies of the 1870s and even
the 1820s. In some important respects, the Berle and Means corporation
emerged well before Berle and Means claimed it did.
One implication of this finding is that the problems and
contradictions Berle and Means identified as consequences of the
separation of ownership from control were likely much more common
throughout the history of the corporation in America than their book
suggests. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of
corporations whose enormous scale was historically unprecedented. Yet
public companies with relatively large numbers of investors and little if
any concentrated shareholding were present from at least the early
nineteenth century. It is likely that there was never a period in which
ownership and control were unified, at least among publicly traded
companies.
Another implication of this finding is that the arguments for a new
conception of the corporation presented in The Modern Corporation apply
to public companies of all eras, past and future, rather than just the big
businesses of the 1930s. If we accept that the separation of ownership from
control transforms the property relationships embodied by the corporation
and the range of interests that should be considered in governing corporate
conduct, then the questions raised by The Modern Corporation are not
historically specific and are relevant to the general concept of the public
corporation.
12. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4.
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I. BERLE AND MEANS ON NINETEENTH CENTURY CORPORATE HISTORY
The Modern Corporation does not present a full history of the
American business corporation. Instead, several chapters begin with
descriptions of early corporations and present a sketch of how they
changed over time to contrast the modern corporate system with historical
enterprise and place the book’s characterizations of modern corporations
in historical context.
The first chapter of the book presents a description of the rise of what
is termed the corporate system, which includes a brief discussion of its
nineteenth century beginnings. Berle and Means characterize nineteenth
century corporations as small enterprises in which ownership and control
were unified: “The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by
individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and
was, in the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals
in control.”13
Berle and Means further elaborate on this characterization, arguing
that the agents to whom management was delegated were carefully
monitored by the owners who possessed strong rights of control:
We have the picture of a group of owners, necessarily delegating
certain powers of management, protected in their property rights by
a series of fixed rules under which the management had a relatively
limited play. The management of the corporation indeed was thought
of as a set of agents running a business for a set of owners; and while
they could and did have wider powers than most agents, they were
strictly accountable and were in a position to be governed in all
matters of general policy by their owners.14

It is important to note that some of the language surrounding these
passages suggests an acknowledgement that there could have been
exceptions to these generalizations; their description of a “typical
business” might allow for atypical businesses with other characteristics.
Indeed, Berle and Means concede that some large corporations emerged
in the early nineteenth century in textile manufacturing in New England
and the significant scale and diffuse ownership of mid-nineteenth century
railroads. But particularly for the early nineteenth century, they argue that,
in general, ownership was not separated from control: “The number of
shareholders was few; they could and did attend meetings; they were
business-men; their vote meant something.”15

13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 125–26 (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 125 n.14.
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Although they do not provide a clear account of the timing of the
transition, Berle and Means argue that large corporations began to emerge
later. The new enterprises displaced the old, smaller ones, creating a new
corporate system:
These units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great
aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of
workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars,
belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are
combined through the corporate mechanism.16

Berle and Means argue that those great aggregations achieved a scale
that was historically unprecedented and obtained control over an evergrowing share of economic activity. Economic and political power were
concentrated to a great extent within a relatively small number of giant
corporations.
And control of those corporations was, in turn, held by a relatively
small number of people. Many of the new enterprises had tens or even
hundreds of thousands of shareholders who were completely passive. This
fundamentally changed the traditional conception of property rights
associated with stock ownership and severed the connection between
corporate ownership and control:
The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far
surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has
exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he
may become merely recipient of the wages of capital.
....
The corporate system appears only when [the] private or “close”
corporation has given way to an essentially different form, the quasipublic corporation: a corporation in which a large measure of
separation of ownership from control has taken place . . . .17

In fact, even the stockholder’s claim on the wages of capital may be
lost, as controlling insiders—either the managers or minority owners—
may use their powers to enrich themselves at the expense of the other
securities holders:
If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is the prime
force motivating control, we must conclude that the interests of
control are different from and often radically opposed to those of
ownership; that the owners most emphatically will not be served by
a profit-seeking controlling group. In the operation of the
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 5.
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corporation, the controlling group even if they own a large block of
stock, can serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense
of the company than by making profits for it.18

But the implications of these historical developments were much
broader to Berle and Means than simple conflicts of interest between the
shareholders and corporate insiders. The transformation of the economy
from one in which production took place within small enterprises operated
by owner-managers to one completely dominated by a handful of large
corporations controlled by managers who were not significant owners, nor
accountable to the owners, constituted a fundamental change. This change
“destroy[ed] the basis of the old assumption that the quest for profits will
spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use,” and
consequently “destroy[ed] the very foundation on which the economic
order of the past three centuries has rested.”19 Berle and Means concluded
that a new concept of the corporation that could account for these changes
was needed.
II. HISTORICAL CLAIMS OF BERLE AND MEANS: NEW EVIDENCE
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, The Modern Corporation
presents a brief account of the rise of a new corporate system. This
corporate system, as described in the book, was the product of three
developments: (A) the displacement of small firms by large corporations;
(B) the growth in the scale of quasi-public corporations; and (C) the
separation of ownership from control as a result of the growth in corporate
scale. In what follows, I introduce new historical evidence regarding each
of these claims and analyze how well they characterize the historical
evolution of the American business corporation. I present a cursory
description of some of the sources and methods used in the analysis in the
text; more complete documentation is presented in the Appendix at the end
of this Article.
A. Displacement of Small Corporations
The Modern Corporation establishes clearly that in the 1930s, large
quasi-public companies accounted for a substantial fraction of economic
activity and dominated many sectors of the economy. But the book’s
account of the rise of the corporate system describes the new aggregations
as “supplanting” smaller corporations, or older private companies “giving
way” to newer public ones.20 In order to evaluate this claim, and to gain a
18. Id. at 114.
19. Id. at 8–9.
20. Id. at 4–5.
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sense of how broadly applicable the claims of The Modern Corporation
are to the governance of corporations generally, it is necessary to trace out
the history of the number of business corporations in the United States. If
large enterprises displaced small ones, then one should expect to observe
a reduction in the number of small corporations and therefore in the total
number of corporations.
Unfortunately, comprehensive data on the number of business
corporations in the United States does not exist for the years prior to the
Revenue Act of 1916, which created the modern income tax system and
corporate income tax.21 However, some American states, particularly
those with large numbers of business corporations, collected detailed
records of operating corporations as part of their systems for the collection
of corporate taxes.22 These states’ records of their own business
corporations provide suggestive evidence for the early evolution of the use
of the corporate form. Beginning in the 1870s, Massachusetts, a state in
which the corporate form found very heavy use, began to collect and
publish detailed data on its corporations. New York, another prolific
creator of early corporations, established capital taxes in earlier periods
that resulted in the collection of records of its corporations. A rough
account of the evolution of the number of American business corporations
can therefore be constructed from comprehensive federal data for the years
following 1916, from Massachusetts data for 1870–1916, and from New
York data, which are available for some years prior to 1870. To account
for the fact that the economy and population grew considerably over time,
the total number of corporations will be scaled by the total population of
the United States, or of the relevant state, from the same year, as obtained
from the federal census.

21. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 62 (2d ed.
2004).
22. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 136–79 (6th ed. 1909).
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Figure 1: Corporations Per Million Persons, 1820–1930
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This figure presents the number of corporations per million persons
from 1918–1930 for the United States, from 1870–1910 for
Massachusetts (with data presented at five-year intervals), and from
1826 and 1868 for New York. All population data are from the
decennial census, linearly interpolated. Data for the states are scaled
by those states’ populations. The sources and methods used to
produce the figure are presented in the Appendix.

Figure 1 presents these data graphically. The point farthest to the
right is for 1930, the year of much of the corporate ownership data
presented in The Modern Corporation. In that year, there were about
519,000 business corporations in the United States; scaling this number by
the total population (about 123.2 million people) results in a ratio of about
4,200 corporations per million people. This number was likely the highest
in the world and shows that American businesses were quite unusual in
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their propensity to utilize the corporate form, particularly among small
enterprises.23
Moving backward in time, the data for the United States shows rapid
growth over the previous twelve years (1918–1930). When we turn to the
period 1870–1910, for which we have data for Massachusetts (scaled by
its population), the pattern of rapid growth in the use of the corporate form
continues back to the year 1900 or so, which represents something of an
inflection point. For the years 1870–1900, growth in the use of the
corporate form was far slower. Then, for the early nineteenth century, the
New York data shows less frequent use of the corporate form and slower
growth in its use. Since the use of the corporate form in New York in the
early twentieth century was generally consistent with that of the nation as
a whole, the years after 1868 must have seen tremendous growth in the
number of corporations in New York.24
An obvious question that arises regarding these data is the
representativeness of the states of Massachusetts and New York. In fact,
those states were among the most prolific creators of business corporations
in the early nineteenth century.25 This implies that the figure likely
overstates the number of corporations for the nineteenth century compared
to the nation as a whole, from which it follows that the growth in the
number of corporations in the years of the late nineteenth or early
twentieth century must have been even more rapid for the nation as a
whole.
We can conclude from these data that in contrast to the claim that
small corporations were somehow displaced or made irrelevant by the rise
of big business, the number of small businesses grew quite rapidly in the
early twentieth century—the rise of the large corporations at the heart of
the book was in fact accompanied by a flourishing of small private
companies. The corporate system chronicled by Berle and Means
apparently co-existed with other corporate systems of smaller and much
more numerous corporations.
23. Leslie Hannah, A Global Corporate Census: Publicly Traded and Close Companies in 1910,
68 ECON. HIST. REV. 548, 553 (2015) (describing how in 1910, the only year for which such evidence
has been compiled, corporations in the United States accounted for 59% of total worldwide
corporations).
24. See infra app. at Table 1.
25. See, e.g., Eric Hilt, Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing
Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, in ENTERPRISING AMERICA: BUSINESS, BANKS
AND CREDIT MARKETS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 73, 78 (William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo
eds., 2015) (showing that the number of charters granted to business corporations in early nineteenth
century Massachusetts was larger than the average for the United States); Eric Hilt, Early American
Corporations and the State, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 48 (Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (showing that the number of charters granted to business
corporations in early nineteenth century New York was larger than the average for the United States).
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B. Growth in the Scale of Quasi-Public Corporations
We turn now to an analysis of how the scale of quasi-public
companies evolved over time. Much of the analysis of The Modern
Corporation is devoted to documenting the ownership of the 200 largest
American corporations in 1930. The ideal way to investigate changes in
the size of quasi-public companies would be to compile data on the 200
largest American businesses in earlier time periods and document the
changes in their average size. Unfortunately, insufficient records exist for
nineteenth century corporations to compile such data. Instead, I begin by
analyzing the size of the very largest corporation in existence in the United
States at various points in time, which can be determined with a reasonable
degree of confidence. Focusing on the single largest company may not
reveal much about the typical quasi-public company, but it does provide a
rough sense of the scale that large corporations had achieved. I then
analyze samples of publicly traded companies from different historical
time periods. These firms are quite representative of the public
corporations of their eras but may not be directly comparable to Berle and
Means’s sample for the 1930s, which consists of the 200 largest
corporations, irrespective of whether they were publicly traded.
To make the relative sizes of different business corporations
comparable over time, I scale the value of their assets by the
contemporaneous value of national income per capita. For example, if a
business had $1 million in assets in 1840, and income per person in 1840
were $100, then the ratio of the two would be 10,000. This would imply
that the total value of the assets of that business was 10,000 times that of
average annual income, or put another way, it would take the incomes of
10,000 average individuals to purchase all the assets of the business. This
ratio therefore has a natural connection to the degree of diffusion of
ownership one would expect to see. And as both values are obtained at the
same point in time, calculating their ratio requires no adjustment for
changes in the price level.
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Figure 2: Scale of the Largest Existing Corporation in the
United States: Total Assets/GDP Per Capita, in Millions

This figure presents the changes in the scale of the largest existing
business corporation in the United States, measured as total assets
relative to GDP per capita. For example, the second point from the
left, the Second Bank of the United States in 1831, is 1.3 million,
meaning that the value of its total assets at that time ($112.7 million)
was equivalent to 1.3 million times the value of GDP per capita in the
United States at that time, which was $86. For sources and data, see
the Appendix.

Figure 2 presents the ratio of the total assets of the largest business
in the United States to nominal income at various points in time. The seven
corporations that reached the status of largest in the country are the First
Bank of the United States (total assets observed in 1801), the Second Bank
of the United States (1831), the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (1855), the
Pennsylvania Railroad (1872), the Union Pacific Railroad (1888), U.S.
Steel (1902), and AT&T (1930). The data in the figure exhibit a dramatic
increase in the twentieth century, with U.S. Steel’s assets of $1.5 billion
being equivalent to more than 5.5 million times income per capita in 1902,
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and AT&T’s assets being equivalent to nearly 9 million times income per
capita in 1932. Consistent with the argument of Berle and Means, the
largest public companies had achieved a scale that was historically
unprecedented in the early twentieth century. The growth in the scale of
the largest enterprises far surpassed the growth of income per person.
It is worth noting that the Second Bank of the United States, with
total assets of more than $100 million, was quite large by any standard,
and in fact more than 1 million times the value of income per capita during
its era. Seen in this context, the political controversies surrounding that
institution are not surprising. But this suggests that Figure 2 likely
understates the contrast between twentieth century corporations and their
predecessors in the early nineteenth century. Whereas there were many
large firms that nearly rivaled U.S. Steel and AT&T in size in the twentieth
century, the second and third-largest corporations in existence in the early
nineteenth century were likely orders of magnitude smaller than the First
and Second Banks of the United States, which were highly unusual
enterprises.
A broader set of comparisons can be made using samples of public
companies. Here I focus on public companies from contexts in which
ownership records are available from archival sources. These include
companies whose shares were traded on the New York Stock & Exchange
Board (the predecessor to the NYSE) in 1825–1826, the corporations
traded on the Boston Stock Exchange in 1872, NYSE-listed corporations
from 1901, and the Berle and Means sample of the 200 largest corporations
in 1930.

430

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:417

Figure 3: Scale of Publicly Traded Corporations in the
United States: Total Assets/GDP Per Capita, in Millions (Log Scale)
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This figure presents the changes in the scale of publicly traded
corporations in the United States. The numbers plotted in the figure
are the average values of total assets for public companies scaled by
GDP per person.

Figure 3 presents the average value of total assets for public
companies scaled, as in Figure 2, by contemporaneous income per person.
Consistent with the data for the largest existing corporations, these data
show a dramatic change in the twentieth century. But here the growth is
even more dramatic, and to present the range of values on a single graph,
the data are presented in logarithmic scale. Whereas the total assets of
public companies in the 1820s and 1870s were equivalent to about 13,000
and 15,000 times income per person, those of 1900 were equivalent to
more than 300,000 times income per person, and those of 1930 were
equivalent to 870,000 times income per person. This is again consistent
with the argument in The Modern Corporation that the quasi-public
company achieved unprecedented scale in the early twentieth century.
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We conclude from these data that Berle and Means were correct in
their characterization of the growing scale of quasi-public corporations
over time. Compared to their 200 firms in 1930, public companies from
the nineteenth century were considerably smaller, even if their scale is
measured relative to income per person.
C. The Separation of Ownership from Control
We now turn to one of the most important arguments of The Modern
Corporation—that ownership separated from control among quasi-public
companies in the early twentieth century. Berle and Means do not give a
precise date for this development, but their description of the history of the
corporation implies that it was relatively recent. I therefore compare the
degree of separation of ownership from control with those of samples of
quasi-public companies from historical periods.
Berle and Means’s conception of the separation of ownership from
control is not necessarily amenable to precise measurement. Except in
cases where they found that a legal device was used to maintain control,
they identified the party or parties in control of an enterprise from the
distribution of ownership itself; for example, firms whose largest owner
held more than half of the shares were designated as being under majority
control, firms whose largest owner held less than half of the shares were
designated as being under minority control, and firms with no substantial
owners were designated as under management control.26 The degree of
separation of ownership from control was inferred from the size of the
ownership stake of the controlling party: the smaller its size, the greater
the degree of separation. Although in principle it may be possible to assign
historical corporations into the Berle and Means categories of control from
their ownership lists, doing so would introduce some uncertainty into the
analysis. For example, the surviving records may not reveal whether
control was held by some legal device. To avoid such questions, I instead
focus on the degree of ownership concentration as a measure of the
separation of ownership from control, which is directly comparable across
samples of companies.
Berle and Means present other data related to the separation of
ownership from control as well. For example, they emphasize the
enormous numbers of shareholders among the largest corporations of their
time, and also the low degree of managerial ownership. Such data are also
available for historical companies and will be presented here.
I begin with an analysis of the total number of shareholders of public
companies, focusing on the same samples of companies presented above.
26. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 69–100.
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These data are presented in Figure 4 in logarithmic scale. As with the
figures displaying the size of corporate assets, the data for corporate
ownership exhibit a similarly dramatic increase in the early twentieth
century.
5

Figure 4: Total Shareholders, Public Corporations (Log Scale)
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This figure presents the changes in the average total number of
shareholders among public companies in the United States. The
average number of shareholders is presented in log scale. For sources
and methods, see the Appendix.

The average number of shareholders increases from less than 200 in
the 1820s; to around 600 in the 1870s; more than 5,000 in 1900; and
around 39,000 in the sample of the 200 largest companies in The Modern
Corporation. The number of shareholders in nineteenth century
corporations was orders of magnitude smaller than in twentieth century
corporations, and Berle and Means were correct in their claim that the
numbers of shareholders among the largest enterprises had grown to
historically unprecedented levels.
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But it may not be the case that ownership is separated from control
when the number of shareholders is large. A large number of shareholders
necessarily implies that a substantial fraction will hold a small stake in the
business, which would likely contribute to passivity among the owners.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the shareholders as a group
have collectively surrendered control of the enterprise when their numbers
are large. A single owner holding a large block or majority of the stock
could have been present among the other owners.
An alternative indication of the structure of ownership is the level of
ownership held by management. As with the total number of owners, this
figure does not clearly indicate the degree of separation of ownership from
control. But it does provide an indication of the extent to which ownership
and management are separated, which is related to the separation of
ownership from control. Managerial ownership data are not presented for
most of the 200 corporations in The Modern Corporation. But they are
available from 1935 and 1995, from data reported to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. They are also available for the same samples of
companies presented above, and for the Bank of New York in 1790.
Figure 5: Managerial Ownership, in Percent:
Large Public Companies
100

90

Managerial Ownership, in Percent

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1790 1800

1825

1850

1875

1900

1925

1950

1975

This figure presents the level of managerial ownership, computed as
the percentage of the common stock held in the names of the officers
and directors, over time. For sources and methods, see the Appendix.
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The data are presented in Figure 5. In contrast to all the previous
figures, these data exhibit no significant changes over time. Whereas the
analysis of Berle and Means generally implies that there should be a
downward trend, particularly in the twentieth century, no such trend is
present. The corporations of the 1930s were substantially larger than their
predecessors and had far greater numbers of shareholders. Yet in terms of
the fraction of shares owned by management, they looked virtually
identical to the public companies of the 1870s, or for that matter, to those
of the 1790s. The data in Figure 5 may suggest that the proportion of shares
held by the management in large public companies is less a function of
corporate scale than other factors, which may not have changed much over
time.
Finally, I turn to the concentration of ownership itself. The two
historical contexts for which complete ownership lists are available for a
substantial number of public companies are the 1825–1826 NYS&EB
corporations, and the 1872 Boston Stock Exchange Corporations. From
the complete ownership lists for these companies, I recorded the size of
the largest block of stock held by any individual or institution. In Table 12
of The Modern Corporation, Berle and Means report the size of the largest
block of shares held in many of their 200 companies. In some cases,
however, they do not have ownership data, but instead indicate that the
company was controlled by a legal device, was presumably under
management or minority control, or was in other special circumstances,
typically receivership. For companies in each of these categories, I assume
that they had no significant owner. This should bias the data in favor of
the argument of Berle and Means, showing a greater degree of ownership
dispersion.
Table 1: Control of American Public Companies Over Time

NYS&EB Listed Companies, 1826

Percent Widely Held:
10% Cutoff
20% Cutoff
(1)
(2)
52
75

Boston Stock Exch. Mfg. & Utility Companies, 1872

80

98

Berle and Means 200 Largest, 1930

59

63

This table presents the degree to which public companies in 1826 and
1872, and the Berle and Means sample of 200 companies from 1930,
were widely held. “Widely Held” is defined as lacking a substantial

2019]

Historical Perspective

435

owner, where substantial is defined in two ways. Column (1) presents
the percentage of the firms in each sample that did not have a 10 %
owner. Column (2) presents the percentage that did not have a 20%
owner. For information on the sources and methods used in
constructing the table, see the Appendix.

Table 1 presents comparisons of the degree to which the 1826, 1872,
and Berle and Means companies (the 200 largest in 1930) were widely
held. Following a categorization fairly standard in the corporate finance
literature, I characterize a company as widely held if it does not have a
significant owner.27 Two thresholds for a significant owner are used: an
owner holding 10%, and an owner holding 20%. The numbers in the table
indicate the percentage of sample companies that are widely held in sense
that they did not have a 10% owner (column (1)) or a 20% owner (column
(2)).
The data in the table completely reject the notion that the 200
companies analyzed by Berle and Means were more widely held, or had
less concentrated ownership, than public companies from earlier eras.
Quite surprisingly, ownership was substantially more concentrated among
the Berle and Means firms than it was among 1872 Boston Stock
Exchange firms. And the ownership of the 200 firms was roughly
comparable (if somewhat more concentrated when a 20% cutoff is used)
to that of the public companies of 1825–1826. At least within the available
samples of public companies presented here, there is no evidence at all that
ownership separated from control in the twentieth century—this was
already the case among nineteenth century public companies, including
those of the 1820s. Even though twentieth century firms were much larger
in scale and had far greater numbers of shareholders, their ownership was
relatively concentrated, and in fact more concentrated than that of many
nineteenth century public firms.
This insight is consistent with the observation made by other scholars
that the data presented in The Modern Corporation does not provide clear
support for the notion that ownership was separated from control to a
significant degree in 1930.28 Only 44% of the 200 firms in Table 13 of the
book were characterized as under management control, for example. If we
acknowledge that the ownership of the Berle and Means firms were in fact
27. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471–74 (1999).
28. Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443,
453 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he evidence on the separation of ownership from control was, though, not
clear-cut”); Kenneth Lipartito & Yumiko Morii, Rethinking the Separation of Ownership from
Management in American History, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025, 1038 (2010) (arguing that “more
recent work tends to show that separation of ownership from control was neither as rapid nor as
thorough as conventional readings of Berle and Means text assume”).

436

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:417

relatively concentrated, then the insight that it was no less concentrated
than that of historical firms becomes somewhat less surprising.
The notion that ownership was separated from control among
nineteenth century public companies is supported by other elements of the
history of America’s securities markets as well. There have been many
episodes in which the “divergence of interest” between controlling
insiders and the outside securities holders of prominent public companies
led to acute problems for their governance. For example, a frustrated
investor in some of the manufacturing firms traded on the Boston Stock
Exchange in the 1860s published a pamphlet, entitled Some of the Usages
and Abuses in our Manufacturing Companies, in which he argued that the
firms’ many small shareholders had become entirely passive and had not
adequately monitored management or participated in the governance of
those firms.29 As a result, the directors, who themselves held only small
ownership stakes in their enterprises, engaged in a variety of transactions
that benefitted themselves at the expense of the other securities holders,
including self-dealing with their own mercantile partnerships for the
purchase of raw material inputs or finished outputs; hiring their relatives
for managerial positions; and paying themselves salaries that were
excessive as well. The author of the pamphlet also argued that the directors
sometimes entrenched themselves in their positions by soliciting proxy
votes from shareholders through duplicitous means.
Evidence of similar governance problems can be found among
nineteenth century railroads and among the 1820s corporations whose
shares were traded on the New York Stock & Exchange Board.30 Although
one must be cautious about generalizing from these episodes—it is unclear
whether they reflected problems typical among early public companies, or
if they were unusual—they do suggest that problems related to the
separation of ownership from control were at least present throughout
much of the history of America’s public companies.
III. DISCUSSION: HISTORY AND THE BERLE AND MEANS CORPORATION
Some of the data presented in this Article have confirmed major
elements of the argument posed by The Modern Corporation. The claim
that quasi-public corporations became much larger over time, and had
greater numbers of shareholders, has been shown to be correct. The 200
corporations in the sample of Berle and Means were radically different
from early or mid-nineteenth century firms in both respects, and although
they did not actually displace small enterprises in the way that Berle and
29. AYER, supra note 11, at 3–4.
30. See Eric Hilt, History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics, 6
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 1, 7–8, 11–13 (2014).
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Means described, they almost certainly did attain a degree of economic
and political power that was historically unprecedented.
Yet it does not follow that the ownership of the large corporations of
the early twentieth century was separated from control to a degree that was
historically unprecedented. Even though the total number of shareholders
among early nineteenth century firms was typically in the low hundreds,
rather than in the hundreds of thousands, there were often no owners of
substantial blocks of their stock. And twentieth century companies with
more than a hundred thousand shareholders sometimes had substantial
blockholders. All else equal, with greater scale one would certainly expect
to find greater diffusion of ownership. Yet the scale of an enterprise is not
the only determinant of the structure of ownership, and the data presented
in this Article have shown that the ownership structure of the relatively
small public companies from the nineteenth century was relatively similar
to that of the corporate giants chronicled in The Modern Corporation.
The American business corporation has undergone a long and
complex process of evolution: the public companies of the 1930s were
quite different than those of the 1870s, 1850s, and 1820s in many
important respects. Despite those differences, the ownership structures of
public companies from all those eras were relatively similar. Although the
entrepreneurs who founded those enterprises and the shareholders who
invested in them operated in different legal, technological, and
institutional contexts, problems related to the separation of ownership
from control and conflicts of interest between controlling insiders and
outside securities holders were always present. There was likely never a
period in which ownership and control were unified, with major
corporations either run by owner-managers, or by a small handful of
owners who delegated management to agents and carefully monitored
their performance. Berle and Means wrote that the “surrender of control
over their wealth by investors” in their era “ha[d] effectively broken the
old property relationships.”31 The property relationships between investors
and public companies never lived up to the ideal of their characterization
of the early history. The problems related to the separation of ownership
from control identified by Berle and Means are likely inseparable from the
institution of the public company.
CONCLUSION: THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION
The analysis of The Modern Corporation culminates in the argument
that the changing role of the corporation in society required the
development of a new conception of the corporation. It was no longer
31. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4.
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merely a legal entity created to facilitate the conduct of business, but it had
become one of the most formidable institutions in society. Its profits were
no longer the product of individual initiative, and its owners no longer took
responsibility for it or participated in its management. Ownership was
separated from control. And the control of these institutions that held so
much influence over everyone’s well-being was held by individuals who
were apparently accountable to no one.
Although it was written mostly in the 1920s, The Modern
Corporation was published during the depths of the Great Depression. The
economic cataclysm of the Great Depression presented fundamental
challenges to policy makers, and the book’s analysis of what it describes
as recent developments in the organization of the economy may have been
perceived as holding insights relevant to the design of a policy response.
In this way, the book’s characterization of the corporate system as
something fundamentally new and specific to the 1930s likely added to its
impact.
Yet the analysis of this Article has shown that some elements of the
book’s description of the corporations of the 1930s were also true of the
public companies of earlier eras. Ownership has likely always been
separated from control, and the shareholders of corporations in the 1820s
and the 1870s would have found some of the argument of The Modern
Corporation familiar. The new concept of the corporation that Berle and
Means urged scholars to develop, if it ever emerges, should be applied to
historical corporations, those of their era, and the corporations of today as
well.
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Appendix
FIGURE 1: CORPORATIONS PER MILLION PERSONS
This figure presents total business corporations at various points in
time, scaled by total population. Population figures were linearly
interpolated from the decennial federal census. No comprehensive data
exists for total corporations in the United States for years prior to the
Revenue Act of 1916, which created the modern income tax system.
Instead, total corporations were collected for New York and
Massachusetts, which collected detailed records of operating corporations
pursuant to their states’ capital taxes. It should be noted that both
Massachusetts and New York were states in which unusually large
numbers of corporations were created, particularly in the early to midnineteenth century. The figure may therefore understate the degree of
change that occurred in the years following 1900.
The sources were as follows:
For New York State: For 1826: collected from the records of New
York’s comptroller relating to New York State’s 1823 capital tax on
corporations, New York State Archives, Albany NY. Ledgers of existing
corporations were found in Record Group A1301 and A1204. For 1868:
New York Senate, Document 91, April 10, 1868. Report of the
Comptroller, Giving the Name of All Stock Corporations Doing Business
in this State, Under General or Special Laws, etc.
For Massachusetts: Total corporations in the state was collected at
five-year intervals over the years 1870–1910 from Report of the Tax
Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. That publication
includes a count of the total number of corporations operating in the state
for those years only. The totals do not include national banks, which had
federal charters, but do include corporations of other states operating in
Massachusetts. The number of national banks was therefore obtained from
the Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency and added to the
total.
For the United States: Total corporations is reported in the Statistics
of Income published by the IRS, beginning in 1916. The years 1916 and
1917 are excluded from the figure, as they include inactive corporations.
These data are included in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Active Proprietorships,
Partnerships, and Corporations—Entities, Receipts, and Profit: 1916–
1998 [All Industries]. Table Ch1-18 in Historical Statistics of the United
States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (Susan B. Carter,
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard
Sutch & Gavin Wright eds., 2006).
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The text states that the rate of use of the corporation in New York in
the early twentieth century was like that of the United States. Data for total
business corporations in New York in 1911 was obtained from the 1909
federal corporate excise tax, published in the Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, indicate that there were nearly 33,000
corporate tax returns filed in New York in that year, implying 3,600
corporations per million persons in that state, relative to 2,900 for the
nation as a whole.
FIGURE 2: SCALE OF THE LARGEST EXISTING CORPORATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: TOTAL ASSETS/GDP PER CAPITA, IN MILLIONS
This table presents a measure of changes in the scale of the largest
business corporations existing in the United States at different points in
time. The measure of their scale is total assets/GDP per person. One way
to interpret this ratio is: how many persons’ incomes would be required to
purchase all the assets of the corporations, assuming their incomes were
the average for the country as a whole.
Another good measure for this scale would be the fraction of all
business assets accounted for by the largest corporation’s assets, but no
reliable or consistent data for total business assets have been compiled for
the nineteenth century.
The dates and corporations chosen represent points in time at which
the largest existing corporation in the United States can be ascertained with
a reasonable degree of confidence. The period between the closure of the
Second Bank of the United States (or its successor, the Bank of the United
States of Pennsylvania), and the publication of Volume 1 of Poor’s
Manual of Railroads (1868) presents the greatest challenge for the
historian seeking to identify the largest corporation in existence. The one
data point selected for this interval (the B&O for 1855) is the most
uncertain; there may well have been other corporations of greater scale
during that period.
The corporations, total assets, and levels of GDP per capita utilized
in the table are as follows
Date
1801
1831
1855
1872
1888
1902
1932

Corporation
Bank of the United States
Second Bank of the United States
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Pennsylvania Railroad
Union Pacific Railroad
U.S. Steel
AT&T

Total Assets
24,040,000
112,775,805
24,881,415
90,072,069
240,747,888
1,546,544,234
4,228,400,000

GDP per Capita
98
86
146
222
225
280
471

Ratio
245,306
1,311,347
170,421
405,730
1,069,991
5,523,372
8,977,495
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The sources utilized for total assets were as follows:
For the First and Second Banks of the United States: John T.
Holdsworth & Davis R. Dewey, Nat’l Monetary Comm’n, 61 Cong., 2nd
Sess. Doc. No. 571. The First and Second Banks of the United States
(1910) (National Monetary Commission, Washington GPO).
For the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad: Annual Report of the President
and Directors to the Stockholders of the Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road
Company (1855).
For the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad:
Poor’s Manual of the Railroads of the United States (1872 and 1888
volumes).
For U.S. Steel: Moody’s Manual of Railroads and Corporation
Securities (1902).
For AT&T: the data is from Berle & Means, The Modern
Corporation And Private Property, supra note 1. The value of nominal
GDP per capita was obtained from table Ca9-19 of Historical Statistics of
the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (Susan
B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead,
Richard Sutch & Gavin Wright eds., 2006).
FIGURE 3: SCALE OF PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: TOTAL ASSETS/GDP PER CAPITA, IN MILLIONS
There are four data points presented in the figure. The last one is for
1932, and it is the average value of total assets for the 200 largest
corporations in 1932, as reported in Table 12 of Berle & Means, The
Modern Corporation And Private Property, supra note 1. The average
value of those corporations’ total assets was about $410 million, making
the ratio of that value to GDP per capita equal to about 871,000.
The next to last is for 1902, and it is total assets (where available) for
all NYSE-listed corporations. There are no easily accessible
comprehensive lists of NYSE-listed securities from that era. The listed
companies are instead obtained from the stock price tables in the New York
Times. There were 195 NYSE-listed companies at the time. For 146 of
those, total assets could be found in Moody’s Manual of Corporation
Securities. The average value of those 146 companies was $90.2 million,
which was approximately 322,000 times income per person at that time.
The third data point from the left was for 1872. This is for companies
traded on the Boston Stock Exchange in that year. There were 130 such
companies; total assets could be found for 97 of them. The sources were:
Report of the Tax Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
for the manufacturing companies and utilities chartered by Massachusetts;
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Annual Report of the Board of Railroad Commissioners of Massachusetts,
for railroads holding Massachusetts charters; and Poor’s Manual of
Railroads, for railroads chartered by other states. Total assets averaged
$3.3 million, which was about 15,000 times income per person in 1872.
The fourth data point is for 1825–1826. There were about sixty-eight
New York corporations whose shares were traded on the NYS & EB
during those years, as indicated in the data of Sylla, Wilson and Wright
(2005). These corporations consisted principally of insurance companies
and commercial banks. Paid-in capital for these firms was obtained from
the records of the New York State comptroller (record group A1301, New
York State Archives, Albany NY). To convert paid-in capital to assets, the
relationship between the two was obtained from balance sheets for banks
and insurance companies from later in the 1820s and from the 1830s. For
commercial banks, the ratio of assets to paid-in capital was about 3, and
for insurance companies it was 1.2. Inflating the capital numbers using
these factors produced an average value of total assets of about $1.1
million, which was about 13,000 times income per person.
The value of nominal GDP per capita was obtained from table Ca919 of Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Present: Millennial Edition (Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner,
Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch & Gavin Wright
eds., 2006).
FIGURE 4: TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS, QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
For 1791: this is for the Bank of New York, which had 193
shareholders. The shareholder list is published in Allan Nevins, History of
the Bank of New York And Trust Company, 1784 to 1934 (1934).
For 1825–1826: Stockholder lists were found for forty-seven of the
NYS & EB companies within the New York State Archives. The lists of
stockholders submitted by the corporations pursuant to the state’s 1823–
1827 tax law were found in various record groups associated with the
comptroller’s office, including A0833, A0829, and A0847. New York
State Archives, Albany NY. The average total number of shareholders was
139.
For 1872: Complete stockholder lists were found for eighty-one of
the companies listed on the Boston Stock Exchange, as part of the
certificates of condition required to be filed annually with the state by
several classes of business corporations. Microfilm copies of these
certificates were found in the Massachusetts State Archives.
Massachusetts railroads submitted a different report to the state’s board of
railroad commissioners, which did not include a full shareholder list, but
did report the total number of shareholders. This was found for sixteen
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Massachusetts railroads listed on the Boston Stock Exchange. For all these
firms together, the average total number of shareholders was 587.
For 1900: The total number of shareholders for sixty-eight NYSElisted corporations for 1900 (or a year very close to 1900) is reported in H.
T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United
States, 39 Q. J. OF ECON. 15 (1924). The average value is 5,034.
For 1930: The total number of shareholders of the Berle and Means
sample of the 200 largest corporations is taken from their Table 12.
FIGURE 5: MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP, IN PERCENT:
LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES
For 1791 and 1825–1826: Lists of directors were obtained from
contemporary sources. These were found for the Bank of New York in
1791, and for thirty-eight of the NYS & EB companies from 1826–26.
(See the description of Figure 4 above for sources). The values for those
years were 11.4% for 1791, and 21.7% for 1826.
For 1872: The names of the directors of the eighty-one Boston Stock
Exchange Corporations that had submitted certificates of condition were
obtained from those certificates and compared to the stockholder lists. The
average value of managerial ownership was 6.8%. (See the description of
Figure 4 above for sources).
For 1935 and 1995: these data are for all NYSE-listed corporations,
as reported in Clifford G. Holderness, Randall S. Kroszner, & Dennis P.
Sheehan, Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes In Managerial
Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression, 54 J. OF FIN. 435 (1999).
TABLE 1: CONTROL OF AMERICAN PUBLIC COMPANIES OVER TIME
For the 1825–1826 companies and the 1872 companies, the
stockholder lists as described in the note on Figure 4 above were searched
for the largest shareholding and coded accordingly. The Berle and Means
companies were coded as having a 20% owner if they were indicated as
being private or if the largest holding reported in Table 12 was 20% or
greater.
The one category of firms for which I deviate from the categorization
of Berle and Means is for companies that had significant owners that were
themselves widely held. Berle and Means argue that when a blockholder
was itself widely held, there are no ultimate significant owners of the firm.
I argue instead that a significant owner, even if itself widely held, would
have a strong incentive to exercise control.

